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Witnessing-condition Heterogeneity and Witnesses’ Versus Investigators’
Confidence in the Accuracy of Witnesses’ Identification Decisions
D. Stephen Lindsay, Elizabeth Nilsen, and J. Don Read
University of Victoria
Undergraduate participants were tested in 144 pairs, with one of each randomly assigned to a
“witness” role and the other to an “investigator” role. Each witness viewed a target person on video
under good or poor witnessing conditions and was then interviewed by an investigator, who
administered a photo lineup and rated his/her confidence in the witness. Witnesses also (separately)
rated their own confidence. Investigators discriminated between accurate and inaccurate witnesses but
did so less well than witnesses’ own confidence ratings and were biased toward accepting witnesses’
decisions. Moreover, investigators’ confidence made no unique contribution to the prediction of
witnesses’ accuracy. Witnesses’ confidence and accuracy were affected in the same direction by
witnessing conditions, and there was a substantial confidence-accuracy correlation when data were
collapsed across witnessing conditions. Confidence can be strongly indicative of accuracy when
witnessing conditions vary widely, and witnesses’ confidence may be a better indicator than
investigators’.
The degree of confidence displayed by witnesses giving identification testimony affects jurors’
assessments of the credibility of the identification evidence (e.g., Cutler, Penrod, & Stuve, 1988;
Leippe, Manion, & Romanczyk, 1992). This is an important finding, but only some of the witnesses
who make suspect-identification decisions in police investigations ever testify in court. For example,
witnesses who do not make a positive identification or who identify a known foil are unlikely to testify
to their identification evidence. Even when a witness identifies a suspect, investigations are often
abandoned for various reasons before they reach trial. Thus jurors see only some of the witnesses who
take identification tests in forensic investigations, but the investigating officers see them all. 
It is likely that police officers form opinions regarding the accuracy of witnesses’ identification
decisions, and such impressions may influence subsequent investigative efforts (e.g., encouraging or
discouraging further investigation of a particular suspect). One aim of the current research was to
explore participant/investigators’ assessments of witnesses’ accuracy. Another aim was to replicate and
extend research by Lindsay, Read, and Sharma (1998), who argued that the relationship between
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1As pointed out by an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this manuscript, there is need for systematic research on
how frequently identification evidence is collected in various kinds of cases and on how often (and under what
circumstances) questions regarding identification accuracy arise.
witnesses’ confidence and accuracy may be stronger across real-world cases than in most research
studies (also see Read, Lindsay, & Nicholls, 1997).
Witnessing-condition Heterogeneity and the Confidence-Accuracy Relationship
Why do lay people expect witnesses’ confidence to be indicative of their accuracy? Lindsay et
al. (1998) speculated that this expectation arises from everyday experiences demonstrating that
individuals with expertise in a given domain tend to be both confident and accurate when tested within
that domain, whereas those without expertise tend to lack both confidence and accuracy. If expertise is
held constant, or varies only from almost none to scant, there is little intuitive reason to expect a strong
confidence-accuracy (CA) relationship.
In most studies of the CA relationship, the CA correlation has been calculated either (a) for
groups of participants who witnessed the target and were tested under a given set of conditions or (b)
across conditions but with none of those conditions leading to high accuracy rates (e.g., see meta-
analysis by Bothwell, Deffenbacher, & Brigham, 1987). When witnessing and test conditions are held
constant only individual differences (in attention, motivation, history, etc.) and unintended procedural
variations can lead to differences in witnesses’ ability to identify the target. Consequently, in a given
condition participants who respond correctly on the lineup test are likely to have only slightly better
ability to identify the target than do participants who respond incorrectly, leading to a weak CA
correlation. Even when the CA correlation is calculated across conditions, a strong relationship would
be expected only if the manipulations endowed some witnesses with quite good ability to identify the
target. For example, Cutler, Penrod, and Martens (1987) compared conditions ranging in accuracy from
17% (about chance) to 55%, and found that the CA collapsed across conditions was only r = .20. When
nearly half of the participants in the best condition err, even those who respond correctly probably do
not have particularly good ability. We propose that strong CA relationships are likely to emerge if
some witnesses have quite good ability to identify the target and others do not.
In real-world cases, witnesses likely differ dramatically one from another in ability to identify
the culprit, due to large differences across cases in witnessing and test conditions.1 At one extreme,
witnesses who had only a brief glimpse of a nondescript culprit under poor viewing conditions perform
a difficult identification test months later. At the opposite extreme, witnesses who spent several
minutes in well-lit, face-to-face interaction with a distinctive perpetrator are given an easy
identification test within hours. Questions about the accuracy of witnesses’ identifications arise across
a wide range along this continuum (for examples of real-world cases involving challenges to
identifications by witnesses who viewed the culprit under good conditions, see Connors, Lundregan,
Miller, & McEwan, 1996; Shepherd, Ellis, & Davies, 1982). To the extent that witnessing and/or test
conditions that greatly increase ability to identify the target also increase confidence, the CA
relationship will be fairly strong across such cases.
Consistent with these ideas, Lindsay et al. (1998) found that manipulations of witnessing
conditions that dramatically affected identification accuracy also affected confidence in the same
direction. On average, the CA correlation for identifications within each of the four conditions used by
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Lindsay et al. was r = .36 (i.e., confidence accounted for only about 13% of the variation in accuracy
within each witnessing condition). When witnessing-condition heterogeneity was increased by
collapsing data across conditions, however, a substantial CA correlation emerged r = .59), such that
confidence accounted for about 35% of the variation in accuracy. 
When conditions differ on a measure, variance on that measure will tend to be greater in data
combined across conditions than in the individual conditions. This does not, however, mean that the
finding of a stronger CA correlation across conditions than within conditions is a statistical artifact,
because the correlation between two measures does not necessarily increase when variability in one of
them increases. Suppose, for example, that the correlation between height and blue eye color is .20
both for men and for women, and that the prevalence of blue eyes is the same in the two sexes; under
those assumptions, combining a sample of men with a sample of women would tend to increase
variance in height but it would not tend to increase the correlation between blue-eyedness and height. If
a variable (such as witnessing condition) affects two measures (such as confidence and accuracy) in the
same direction, then the correlation between those measures will tend to be greater in data collapsed
across those conditions than in the individual conditions, but this is not an uninteresting statistical
artifact but rather the central point of the witnessing-condition heterogeneity argument: Real-world
witnesses differ widely one from another in witnessing conditions, and witnessing conditions may
often affect confidence and accuracy in the same direction, such that highly confident witnesses are
substantially more likely to be accurate than non-confident witnesses.
Even with the data collapsed across witnessing conditions, the CA correlation reported by
Lindsay et al. (1998) was far short of a perfect relationship. Moreover, a wealth of prior research
demonstrates that manipulations can affect accuracy without affecting confidence and vice versa,
which shows that confidence is not based solely on ability. Thus our claim is not that confidence is a
perfect indicator when witnesses vary widely in ability to identify the target, but merely that it can be a
substantially better indicator than most previous research implies.
Investigators’ Assessments of Witnesses’ Accuracy
As noted above, police investigators encounter a highly heterogeneous range of witnesses, from
those who had only a fleeting glimpse of a nondescript perpetrator to those who spent substantial time
in face-to-face interaction with a distinctive culprit. The Lindsay et al. (1998) findings suggest that
such witnesses’ self-rated confidence can be substantially predictive of their accuracy, at least if the
identification test is conducted in a non-biased manner shortly after the witnessing event. To the best of
our knowledge, police rarely ask witnesses for confidence ratings, but it seems likely that they often do
make subjective assessments of witnesses’ accuracy, and that such assessments can affect subsequent
investigative efforts. This raises the question of how accurately investigators assess witnesses’
accuracy.
Several studies have assessed participant-jurors’ perceptions of witnesses’ identification
testimony (e.g., by showing them a videotape of a witness being cross examined about identification
evidence) (e.g., Leippe et al., 1992; R. C. L. Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells & Leippe, 1981;
Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). Such studies have generally found that participant-jurors display
little ability to discriminate between accurate and inaccurate witnesses, tend to place undue faith in
witnesses who viewed the target under poor conditions, and are overly affected by witnesses’ apparent
confidence. There are reasons to speculate, however, that police investigators have better insight than
jurors into witnesses’ accuracy: Investigators actively interact with witnesses (rather than passively
observing their testimony) and they do so while the witness is making the initial identification
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judgment (rather than long after the witness has committed to that judgment and been prepared for
trial). Also, the witness may make any of a variety of responses during an initial identification test,
whereas only witnesses who made a positive identification with at least a modicum of confidence are
likely to testify in court or agree to be “cross examined” in a study.
The Current Experiment
Participants were tested in pairs, with one member of each pair randomly assigned to a
“witness” role and the other to an “investigator” role. Each witness viewed a target person on video
under good or poor witnessing conditions and was then interviewed by the investigator. The
investigator administered a photo lineup identification test (which either included or did not include the
target) and questioned the witness preparatory to rating the witness’s accuracy. Each witness also
(separately) rated his/her own confidence. The procedure met all four of the recommendations
proposed by Wells, Small, Penrod, Malpass, Fulero, and Brimacombe (1998): Foils were selected on
the basis of fitting a description of the target, the investigator was blind to the identity of the target,
witnesses were informed that the target might not be present in the lineup, and witnesses’ confidence
was assessed immediately after the identification. We predicted that, as in Lindsay et al. (1998),
witnessing condition would affect witnesses’ accuracy and confidence in the same direction, and that
the within-condition CA correlations would be modest but that collapsing across conditions would
reveal a substantial CA relationship. We also expected that investigators would discriminate between
accurate and inaccurate witnesses, but that they would do so less well than witnesses’ own confidence
ratings. Finally, we predicted that investigators would be biased toward accepting witnesses’
identification decisions as accurate.
Method
Participants
The participants were 288 University of Victoria undergraduate students who received a $5
payment or optional extra credit in an introductory psychology course.
Materials
 Each witness viewed one of two videos, each of which showed the same target (a young white
man). One video was 10 s long and showed the target from one perspective, in one setting, wearing one
outfit. The other video was 3 min long and depicted the target from a variety of perspectives, in several
locations, and wearing several different outfits.
Witnesses were tested on one of four photo lineups, each consisting of eight head and shoulder
frontal color photos of young white men wearing white lab coats and a “not present” sign. There were
two target-absent and two target-present lineups: The two versions of each lineup type differed only in
the location of the individual pictures. Foils closely fit a description of the target.
The rating scale for witnesses asked, “How confident do you feel that the person you picked in
the photo lineup was the person you saw in the video?” (or, for those who chose the “not present”
response alternative, how confident they were of the accuracy of that decision). The rating ranged from
1 (“purely guessing”) to 11 (“100% confident”). Investigators were asked, “How accurate do you feel
the witness is?,” responding on a scale from 1 (“certainly inaccurate”) to 11 (“certainly accurate”). 
Procedure
Participants were tested in pairs, with one member of each pair randomly assigned to the
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 2Investigators’ behaviors were not recorded. The experimenter’s (EN) retrospective impression is that most investigators
confined themselves to the sample questions or to slight paraphrases of them, but that some also asked witnesses a question
along the lines of, “Why did you pick that person?”
witness role and the other to the investigator role. The investigator was given a clipboard with a photo
lineup hidden beneath an instruction sheet, and sat outside the testing room and read the instructions,
which explained that the witness was viewing a person on video and that subsequently the investigator
was to administer a photo lineup identification test and question the witness with the aim of rating the
witness’s accuracy. Meanwhile, the witness was assigned to either the good or poor witnessing
condition by a predetermined schedule. Witnesses in the good condition viewed the 3-min video,
without any particular instructions, immediately after which the investigator entered the room and
administered the lineup test. Witnesses in the poor condition were instructed to attend to the location in
which the video was filmed; after viewing the 10-s video they completed a 2-min filler task and then
wrote a brief description of the location in which the video was filmed before receiving the lineup test.
The investigator was outside the testing room for approximately 3 min in both the good and
poor conditions, and was not informed of the witnessing-condition manipulation. The investigator
entered the testing room and administered the lineup test by reading the instructions aloud and placing
the lineup on a table in front of the witness. The instructions read by the investigator informed the
witness that the man seen in the video might or might not be present in the lineup, and asked him/her to
point to that man’s picture or the "not present" sign. The investigator then asked the witness questions
about the witness’s confidence in the decision. Two sample questions were supplied on the
investigator’s instruction sheet (“How do you feel about your decision?” and “How easy was it for you
to make your judgment?”) and the instructions encouraged the investigator to ask any other questions
that s/he thought might help assess the witness’s accuracy.2 The experimenter then provided the
witness and investigator with clipboards with the printed confidence scales. Confidence ratings were
made separately by the witness and investigator, who held up their clipboards so that they could not see
each other’s rating. 
Results
We first report analyses of data from all 144 witness/investigator pairs, then describe findings
for pairs in which the witness made a positive identification (as opposed to responding “not present”).
For both sets of analyses, data were collapsed across the target-absent/target-present manipulation on
the ground that in real-world cases investigators do not know whether or not the culprit is in the lineup
(Wells, 1993).
All Witness Decisions
Witnesses’ confidence and accuracy. Table 1 shows distributions of witnesses’ confidence as a
function of condition and accuracy. Responses were significantly more often accurate in the good
witnessing condition (85%) than in the poor witnessing condition (33%), P2(1, N = 144) = 39.31, p <
.01. Also, confidence was significantly higher in the good witnessing condition (M = 7.64, sd = 2.5)
than in the poor witnessing condition (M = 4.08, sd = 1.95), F(1, 142) = 90.75, MSe = 5.02, p < .001.
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Table 1: Frequency Distributions of Witnesses’ Confidence Ratings in all Witness Decisions.
Confidence Rating
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Good
Accurate 0 0 3 1 7 0 12 8 13 7 10
Inaccurate 0 1 3 2 1 0 1 1 2 0 0
Poor
Accurate 0 1 9 2 4 2 5 0 0 0 1
Inaccurate 1 12 13 9 7 2 1 2 1 0 0
Both
Accurate 0 1 12 3 11 2 17 8 13 7 11
Inaccurate 1 13 16 11 8 2 2 3 3 0 0
Due to the skewed distributions, Spearman rank order correlation coefficients were used to
assess the CA relationship (the same pattern of results was obtained when the data were analyzed with
Pearson biserial correlation coefficients). Confidence and accuracy were significantly correlated in both
conditions, and although the CA relationship was directionally stronger in the good witnessing
condition (r(70) = .37, p < .01) than in the poor witnessing condition (r(70) = .26, p < .02), a Fisher r-
to-z transform for the difference between two independent correlations indicated that this difference
was not statistically reliable, z = 0.72, ns. Most important, when data were collapsed across conditions
the CA correlation was a fairly substantial r(142) = .55, p < .001. The 95% confidence intervals for rho,
estimated with a Fisher r-to-z transform, were .43 to .65.
Investigators’ confidence and witnesses’ accuracy. Table 2 shows the distribution of
investigators’ confidence ratings as a function of condition and accuracy. Investigators’ confidence was
significantly greater in the good witnessing condition (M = 7.94, sd = 2.64) than in the poor witnessing
condition (M = 6.00, sd = 2.43), F(1, 142) = 21.00, MSe = 6.44, p < .001. Investigators’ confidence
was reliably related to witnesses’ accuracy in the good witnessing condition (r(70) = .32, p < .01) but
not in the poor witnessing condition (r(70) = .13, ns). These values did not reliably differ, z = 1.18, ns.
With data collapsed across conditions, the correlation between investigators’ confidence and witnesses’
accuracy was significant (r(142) = .38, p < .001; 95% confidence intervals = .23 to .51).
To test investigators’ bias in assessing witnesses’ decisions, investigators’ confidence ratings of
1 (certainly inaccurate) to 5 (maybe inaccurate) were coded as “judged inaccurate,” and those of 7
(maybe accurate) to 11 (certainly accurate) were coded as “judged accurate” (five pairs with ratings of
6 were deleted). Investigators were biased toward accepting witnesses’ decisions as accurate: They
correctly judged 73% of the accurate identification responses as accurate, but they correctly judged
only 51% of the inaccurate responses as inaccurate. A test of the difference between two independent
proportions showed that this bias was reliable, z = 2.69, p < .01.
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3
 The confidence scale used by witnesses (from “purely guessing” to “100% confident) differed from that used by
investigators (from “certainly inaccurate” to “certainly accurate”). The rationale for this difference is that it would not make
sense for witnesses to be confident that they were wrong (if they were sure a response was wrong then they would make a
different response), but investigators could sensibly believe that a witness was wrong. Nonetheless, the difference raises the
possibility that the weaker CA corre lation for the latter scale is an uninteresting measurement artifact. Against this
possibility, the ranges of the two measures were virtually identical (see Tables 1-4) and the variance in confidence within
each witnessing condition was directionally greater for investigators’ confidence than for witnesses’ confidence.
Table 2: Frequency Distributions of Investigators’ Confidence Ratings in all Witness Decisions.
Confidence Rating
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Good
Accurate 0 1 4 2 4 3 5 5 12 12 13
Inaccurate 0 0 2 1 3 0 2 1 1 1 0
Poor
Accurate 0 0 5 2 4 0 5 0 4 2 2
Inaccurate 0 4 7 3 9 2 14 1 8 0 0
Both
Accurate 0 1 9 4 8 3 10 5 16 14 15
Inaccurate 0 4 9 4 12 2 16 2 9 1 0
Witnesses’ versus investigators’ CA relationship. As can be seen by comparing the r values
reported in the preceding two subsections, the correlation between investigators’ confidence and
witnesses’ accuracy tended to be weaker than the corresponding correlation between witnesses’
confidence and their own accuracy. This was the case directionally for all three comparisons, although
the difference was statistically reliable only for the data collapsed across witnessing condition (the
most forensically relevant as well as the most statistically powerful comparison), t(141) = -3.13, p <
.01. For the data set as a whole, witnesses’ confidence was twice as predictive of accuracy as was
investigators’ confidence (r2 values of .30 and .15 for witnesses’ and investigators’ confidence,
respectively).3 Investigators’ and witnesses’ confidence ratings were strongly correlated with each other
(for the good and poor witnessing conditions, respectively, r(70) = .60 and .69, ps < .001; across
conditions, r(140) = .70, p < .001).
Logistic regression analyses of witnessing condition, witnesses’ confidence, and investigators’
confidence as predictors of accuracy. The foregoing analyses reveal that witnessing condition,
witnesses’ confidence, and investigators’ confidence were each related to witnesses’ accuracy. They do
not, however, indicate if these variables were predictive of accuracy independently of one another. To
explore this question, we conducted a series of logistic regression analyses. Preliminary analyses
indicated no significant 2- or 3-way interactions between witnessing condition, witnesses’ confidence,
and interviewers’ confidence. A subsequent logistic regression with witnessing condition, witnesses’
confidence, and interviewers’ confidence indicated that the three predictors combined correctly
Eyew itnessing-Condition Heterogeneity          8
classified 75% of the subjects, P2(3, N = 144) = 57.942, p < .001. That analysis revealed that
witnessing condition (P2(1) = 8.68, p < .001) and witnesses’ confidence (P2(1) = 9.27, p < .001) made
unique contributions to predicting accuracy, whereas investigators’ confidence did not (P2(1) = 0.94,
ns). The odds ratio for witnesses’ confidence (1.463) indicates that the likelihood that a witness was
correct increased nearly one and a half times for each 1-point increase along the 11-point witnesses’
confidence scale.
Identifications Only
The analyses reported in this section must be interpreted with caution, due to the small number
of accurate identifications in the poor witnessing condition (9 out of 43) and the small number of
inaccurate identifications in the good witnessing condition (4 out of 33). These analyses are of
particular interest, however, because identifications may have more serious real-world implications
than responses of “not present.”
Table 3: Frequency Distributions of Witnesses’ Confidence Ratings in Identifications.
Confidence Rating
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Good
Accurate 0 0 1 0 3 0 5 4 5 4 7
Inaccurate 0 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Poor
Accurate 0 0 1 2 2 1 3 0 0 0 0
Inaccurate 0 7 13 6 2 2 1 2 1 0 0
Both
Accurate 0 0 2 2 5 1 8 4 5 4 7
Inaccurate 0 7 15 6 3 2 2 2 1 0 0
Witnesses’ confidence and accuracy for identifications. Table 3 shows the distribution of
confidence ratings by witnesses who made identifications as a function of condition and accuracy.
Identifications were significantly more often accurate in the good witnessing condition (88%) than in
the poor witnessing condition (21%), P2(1, N = 76) = 33.474, p < .001. Also as predicted, confidence in
identifications was significantly higher in the good witnessing condition (M = 8.03, sd = 2.51) than in
the poor witnessing condition (M = 4.16, sd = 1.89), F(1, 74) = 58.91, MSe = 4.74, p < .001.
Confidence and accuracy were significantly correlated in both conditions, and although the CA
relationship was directionally stronger in the good witnessing condition (r(31) = .47, p < .01) than in
the poor witnessing condition (r(41) = .32, p < .05) this difference was not reliable, z = 0.47, ns. When
the data were collapsed across conditions, the CA correlation for identifications was a very substantial
r(74) = .68, p < .001 (95% confidence intervals = .54 to .79).
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Investigators’ confidence and witnesses’ accuracy for identifications. Table 4 shows the
distribution of investigators’ confidence ratings for identifications as a function of condition and
accuracy. Investigators were reliably more confident in witnesses in the good condition (M = 8.30, sd =
2.30) than in those in the poor condition (M = 6.19, sd = 2.15), F(1, 74) = 17.04, MSe = 4.91, p < .001.
Investigators’ confidence was reliably related to witnesses’ accuracy in the good witnessing condition,
r(31) = .47, p < .01, but not in the poor witnessing condition, r(41) = .19, ns. The difference between
the two correlations was not statistically significant, z = 1.32, p = .09. Collapsing across witnessing
conditions, the correlation between investigators’ confidence and witnesses’ accuracy was reliable,
r(74) = .50, p < .001 (95% confidence intervals = .31 to .65).
As in the complete data set, investigators’ bias was assessed by categorizing their confidence
ratings as “judged inaccurate” (ratings of 1 to 5) or “judged accurate” (ratings of 7 to 11). Investigators’
had a substantial and significant bias toward accepting witnesses’ identifications as accurate: 89% of
accurate identifications were correctly perceived as accurate, but only 44% of false identifications were
correctly judged inaccurate, z = 3.93, p < .001.
Table 4: Frequency Distributions of Investigators’ Confidence Ratings in Identifications.
Confidence Rating
Condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Good
Accurate 0 0 1 0 1 3 3 3 3 10 5
Inaccurate 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0
Poor
Accurate 0 0 1 1 0 0 4 0 3 0 0
Inaccurate 0 3 4 0 6 2 13 1 5 0 0
Both
Accurate 0 0 2 1 1 3 7 3 6 10 5
Inaccurate 0 3 4 1 8 2 14 1 5 0 0
Witnesses’ versus investigators’ confidence and accuracy of identifications. In the poor
witnessing condition and for data collapsed across conditions, the relationship between witnesses’
confidence and accuracy tended to be stronger than the relationship between investigators’ confidence
and witnesses’ accuracy, although this difference was reliable only for data collapsed across condition,
t(73) = 2.79, p < .01. Over both conditions, witnesses’ confidence was nearly twice as predictive of the
accuracy of their identifications as was investigators’ confidence (r2 values of .46 and .25 for
witnesses’ and investigators’ confidence, respectively). Investigators’ and witnesses’ confidence
ratings correlated with each other (for the good witnessing conditions, r(31) = .56, p < .001; for the
poor witnessing condition, r(41) = .71, p < .001; across conditions, r(72) = .72, p < .001).
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Logistic regression analyses of witnessing condition, witnesses’ confidence, and investigators’
confidence as predictors of accuracy of identifications. These analyses paralleled those of the complete
data set. There were no significant 2- or 3-way interactions between witnessing condition, witnesses’
confidence, and interviewers’ confidence as predictors of the accuracy of identifications. The three
predictors combined yielded 75% prediction accuracy(P2(3) = 49.67, p < .001). Witnesses’ confidence
(P2(1) = 5.52, p < .025) and witnessing condition (P2(1) = 9.11, p < .001) made significant unique
contributions, whereas investigators’ confidence did not (P2(1) = 0.26, ns). The odds ratio indicated
that the likelihood that a witnesses’ identification was accurate increased 1.6 times for every unit
increase in the confidence scale.
 Discussion
Our findings regarding the relationship between witnesses’ self-rated confidence and the
accuracy of their identification decisions replicated the pattern reported by Lindsay et al. (1998).
Specifically, when data from good and poor witnessing conditions were collapsed to create substantial
heterogeneity across witnesses in ability to identify the target, witnesses’ confidence was quite strongly
correlated with their accuracy. The correlation was far from perfect–some non-confident witnesses
were accurate and some confident witnesses were not–but the relationship was considerably stronger
than it is generally said to be (e.g., for identifications, r = .68). These findings indicate that witnesses’
self-rated confidence can have substantial value as an indicator of the accuracy of identification
responses collected in a non-biased manner shortly after the witness viewed the to-be-identified person.
The substantial CA relationships obtained in this study and in some others (e.g., Lindsay et al.,
1998; Read et al., 1997; Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995) should not be construed as evidence
that the confidence witnesses display in court predicts the accuracy of their identification testimony.
Myriad social, cognitive, and statistical factors likely greatly attenuate the CA relationship over the
months between when a crime was witnessed and when the witness testifies (see Lüüs & Wells, 1994,
and Wells & Bradfield, 1998, 1999). It is not to courtroom testimony to which the current findings may
generalize, but rather to initial identification decisions made in non-biased testing situations shortly
after a witnessed event.
The novel findings from this study are those concerning participant-investigators’ confidence
ratings. Investigators appeared to be sensitive to witnesses’ confidence, in that witnessing condition
had a reliable effect of investigators’ confidence (even though investigators were not informed of the
witnessing-condition manipulation) and investigators’ confidence was correlated with witnesses’
confidence. However, although investigators demonstrated some ability to differentiate between
accurate and inaccurate witnesses, in general they did so more poorly than witnesses themselves.
Indeed, the logisitic regression analyses revealed that investigators’ confidence made no independent
contribution to the prediction of witnesses’ accuracy. Investigators also revealed a bias toward
accepting witnesses’ decisions as accurate, and this bias was particularly evident for positive
identification decisions.
It may be that trained police investigators working in real-world situations are better able to
distinguish between accurate and inaccurate witnesses, and less biased toward accepting witnesses’
judgments as accurate, than our participant-investigators. Formal training, the richness of naturalistic
situations involving motivated witnesses, and extensive experience with numerous feedback
opportunities (as when a witness confidently identifies a known foil) may enable forensic investigators
to develop finely tuned perceptions of witnesses’ likely accuracy. On the other hand, it may be that
police tend to perform less well on these judgments than our participant-investigators did; our
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participant-investigators explicitly questioned witnesses preparatory to making a quantitative rating of
their confidence in the witness’s response immediately after the identification judgment was given,
whereas police may tend to assess witnesses’ accuracy more informally, indirectly, and without making
a record of that assessment. Moreover, our participant-investigators had no inside knowledge (e.g., no
information about which if any member of the lineup was the “suspect”) and no obvious motivation
toward anything other than accuracy, whereas real-world police investigators may sometimes have
considerable investment in the identification of a particular known suspect in the lineup.
In their influential “white paper” proposing guidelines for identification procedures, Wells et al.
(1998) recommended that “a clear statement should be taken from the eyewitness at the time of the
identification . . . as to his or her confidence” (p. 635). The rationale for this proposal was that although
the CA correlation is weak it tends to be greater than zero for initial identifications, whereas post-
identification processes such as social influence and commitment effects are likely to weaken the CA
correlation over time: Given that witnesses’ confidence is likely to affect jurors, Wells et al. argued, it
is better that confidence be assessed immediately and formally at the initial identification rather than
only much later and informally in court. 
The current findings provide new evidence of the importance of assessing witnesses’
confidence at the time of the identification, by showing that the CA relationship across highly
heterogenous witnesses can be quite strong at initial identification and that witnesses’ self-rated
confidence following identification decisions can be more diagnostic of accuracy than investigators’
assessments. If the current findings are shown to generalize to more naturalistic situations, with
realistic simulated crimes viewed by naive witnesses (and, ideally, with police experts conducting the
identification interviews), the implications would be clear: Forensic investigators, blind to the identity
of the suspect, should ask witnesses to provide quantitative confidence ratings immediately after
making their identification judgments. 
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